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Battered Immigrant Youth Take the Beat: Special
Immigrant Juveniles Permitted to Age-Out of
Status
Emily Rose Gonzalez1
When “S” was only five years old, his father abandoned his family.2
Soon after, S’s mother began to release her anger towards S’s father on S,
abusing him both physically and emotionally.3 S’s mother would beat S
regularly with a cord or rope, leaving his back completely black and blue.4
Further, S’s mother was verbally abusive, frequently insulting S and even
threatening to kill him.5 S also believed that his mother encouraged his
older half brother to abuse him.6 S’s half brother once knocked him
unconscious by throwing a rock at him, and on another occasion, dumped
boiling water on S’s legs.7 S finally ran away from home and attempted to
live with other family members, but they ended up physically abusing him
as well.8 Ultimately, S managed to make it to the United States (U.S.) where
he hopes to receive Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJ status).
Similarly, “T” suffered harsh physical abuse at the hands of her
stepfather, beginning at the young age of eight.9 Not only did T’s stepfather
prevent her from leaving the house, seeing her friends, and attending soccer
practice, but he was also verbally and physically violent.10 When T
disobeyed her stepfather, he would beat her with a tree branch or a whip,
leaving cuts and bruises on her back and legs for days.11 Although T’s
mother knew about the physical and emotional abuse by the stepfather, she
did nothing to stop it.12 With no other family in her home country, T
ventured to the U.S.13 She too hopes to receive SIJ status.
“R,” a fifteen-year-old Honduran, was also fortunate enough to escape
the extreme physical abuse he suffered at the hands of his stepfather.14 R’s
stepfather beat him severely with rods, pieces of wood, and a machete
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handle; he also burned him with hot objects.15 R managed to flee to the U.S.
to seek a safe haven, but instead found himself placed in a detention center
by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).16
Congress created SIJ status so that legal citizenship could be obtained by
abandoned, abused, or neglected children. Yet, even though they are
eligible, countless children are unable to obtain this status due to an “ageout” predicament. Even if these children are able to apply for SIJ status,
getting that status can take years, and sometimes the applications fail
because processing time has run out.17 Applications for SIJ status are lost,
some multiple times.18 At least one attorney has testified to a culture of “no”
and passiveness towards SIJ applications. The attorney asserts that at the
Department of Homeland Security Immigration Services she was “told by a
supervisor she wouldn’t want anybody to take the risk of approving [an SIJ
status application] and risk getting fired.”19 Furthermore, although the lack
of aging-out protection undermines the purpose and intent of the SIJ statute,
a federal district court recently ruled that the Department of Homeland
Security’s (DHS) lack of an age-out regulation is permissible.20
Section I examines the SIJ statute, its history, and the requirements for
SIJ status eligibility. It also addresses the age-out phenomenon and the
repercussions of aging-out for SIJs. This section also deals with the DHS’s
unaccountability and delay in allowing SIJs to age-out of the status that has
been specially provided for them by Congress. Currently, no policy or
legislation exists to compel DHS or state courts to look into SIJ eligibility.21
The section proceeds with a discussion on the differing age requirements for
states’ foster care eligibility. It then concludes with a focus on the aftermath
of SIJs aging-out and why these children should be given the utmost
opportunity to receive the status Congress has specifically reserved for
them.
Section II examines the recent district court case Perez-Olano v.
Gonzalez, where the court held that SIJs can age-out of status. This section
argues that Perez-Olano was wrongly decided and that, in interpreting the
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ultimate purpose of the SIJ statute, the court erroneously interpreted that
purpose.
Section III is an examination of legal conventions that provide support
for an SIJ’s inability to age-out. It argues that the Child Status Protection
Act should include SIJs in its list of immigrant children that it prevents from
aging-out of legal citizenship opportunities. The section further holds that
SIJs, like unaccompanied child asylum-seekers, should be prevented from
aging-out because of the two groups’ striking similarities. Next, the section
demonstrates how SIJs can fulfill all the elements necessary for asylum
eligibility. Section III then addresses the shamed reality that the U.S. is not
a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child; however, if it
were, these youths would be prevented from aging-out in order to bring the
statute into accordance with the Convention. Section IV argues that, like
other countries, the U.S. should acknowledge that children have special
needs; as such, children should be afforded a right to legal representation.
Last, Section V provides recommendations for relieving the SIJ age-out
problem and answers why such changes are necessary. To remedy the
problems surrounding the aging-out of potential SIJs, the SIJ statute needs
to be amended to prevent these children from aging-out, and the PerezOlano case must be challenged and overturned. Allowing an applicant to
age-out of SIJ status eligibility is not only wrong because these applicants
are some of the most vulnerable and deserving undocumented immigrants
in the U.S., but also because this circumstance is inconsistent with other
U.S. immigration policies and international law. In addition to revision of
the SIJ statute and the Perez-Olano decision, SIJ applicants should be
appointed representation in order to protect their interests and ensure the
timely execution of their applications. SIJ applications should be expedited
and not placed in the control of immigration officers, many of whom focus
on deportation. Lastly, the U.S. should treat SIJ applicants as
unaccompanied asylum-seekers in order to afford these minors the same
age-out protection and international recognition as other asylees.
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I. SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS
In 1990, Congress added the SIJ status provision to the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), codified at 101(a)(27)(J) and 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(27)(J).22 The SIJ statute provides a means to obtain legal
citizenship status for some of the most vulnerable and deserving
undocumented immigrants in the U.S.––children abandoned, abused, or
neglected by their own families.23 In 2007, an estimated 1.6 million SIJs
(i.e., immigrant children eligible for SIJ status) lived in the U.S., with “at
least 110,000 in New York State alone.”24 However, as of 2008,
approximately 500 SIJ status applications for permanent residency have
been adjudicated by the DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS).25
It is imperative that these children’s applications are expedited and heard
immediately, and that they receive SIJ status as soon as possible. Without
legal status, these children lack rights and benefits. While these children are
on the streets or in the underground world of undocumented immigrants,
they are ineligible for public benefits such as medical care and student
loans.26 SIJ applicants also cannot legally apply for employment, and it is
nearly impossible for them to legally pursue an education beyond high
school.27 Despite the large group of children that come to the U.S. seeking
refuge from their abusive past and the beginning of a better life, SIJ status
remains relatively unknown, seemingly complex, and underutilized.28 Given
these circumstances, this article focuses on advocating that an SIJ should
not be allowed to age-out of eligibility if his or her application were
submitted when the age requirement was fulfilled (i.e., while the SIJ was
under the age of eighteen or twenty-one, depending on applicable state law).
Statutory protections need to be put in place to prevent this occurrence.
A. Special Immigrant Juvenile Eligibility
To be eligible for SIJ status, the child must meet the following criteria:
(1) the child must be under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court or the
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probate and family court due to family abuse, neglect, or abandonment; (2)
the child must be “deemed eligible for long-term foster care,” meaning the
child cannot be reunified with his or her family because of past abuse,
neglect, or abandonment, and that reunification efforts have ceased; (3) the
court must determine that it is not in the child’s best interest to return to the
child’s home country; and (4) the court must issue a signed order stating
that the child meets the above criteria for SIJ status.29 Further, the child
must also meet the requirements for lawful permanent residence (LPR)
status.30 As such, the child must not have a criminal conviction, a history of
drug use or prostitution, HIV/AIDS or other certain physical or mental
conditions, or other immigration violations. If any of these conditions are
present, the SIJ application may be denied.31
Additionally, as there is a unique administrative mechanism set by
Congress, SIJ applicants must go through multiple courts. The process
requires the cooperation of state and local child welfare systems, state
juvenile courts, and ICE.32 To apply for SIJ status, children must go through
both ICE and the state juvenile dependency system.33 The law gives state
courts the power to determine the minor’s needs and requires that ICE rely
on the state juvenile or family court’s findings.34 Afterward, ICE determines
the child’s eligibility based upon the state court’s finding.35 One author
notes that, given these entangled responsibilities without clear roles for ICE
and state courts, Congress has set the stage for conflict between federal and
state governments.36 This tension adds to ongoing disputes between federal
and state agencies. For example, normally, ICE has the primary
responsibility for verifying and determining the underlying facts supporting
an immigrant’s petition for relief.37 However, under the SIJ statute, ICE
must defer to the findings of the state court, and ICE has no authority to
review the state court’s determinations.38 This complicated network places a
great burden on the children and their legal representatives, and causes
additional time and delay in the application process.
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B. The “Age-Out” Predicament
Due to the workings, intricacies, and other problems with the SIJ statute,
countless children in the child welfare system ultimately “age-out” of
eligibility for SIJ status. There are a broad range of reasons why children
age-out: lack of legal representation; nonrecognition by legal authorities of
a child’s eligibility early on; a child’s unawareness of the availability of SIJ
status; or aging-out of a child while his or her application is pending.39
Many children age-out of the family court and foster care systems before
anyone recognizes their eligibility for SIJ status.40 Routinely, neither agency
caseworkers, legal guardians, nor judges determine the legal status of these
children upon first contact with them.41 Moreover, there is no legislation
that requires foster care services to make these inquiries, even though they
are responsible for caring for these children.
Even more troubling, SIJs are allowed to age-out of their eligibility
because there is nothing in the current SIJ statute that obligates the courts to
expedite or hear SIJ cases before the children age-out. First, in order to be
statutorily eligible for SIJ status the child must be dependent on a state court
at the time the SIJ petition or SIJ-based adjustment of status application is
decided. Hence, USCIS will automatically revoke that status when the
youth ceases to be a dependent of the state.42 Generally, state courts
terminate jurisdiction when the child reaches eighteen or nineteen-years of
age (a few states care for children up to the age of twenty-one), depending
on the age limit of child dependency for that particular state. If USCIS
refuses to adjudicate a statutorily-eligible youth’s petition by the time the
dependency order terminates, the minor ages-out of the benefit.43
Furthermore, in order for the immigration judge to adjudicate the SIJ’s
application, DHS must complete a security investigation on the child;
however, this often takes months, leaving children to age-out in the
meantime.44 Hence, by merely holding onto an application, an immigration
officer can easily defeat a child’s claim for SIJ status, as nothing in the SIJ
statute requires that an application be adjudicated before the applicant ages-
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out.45 Even if not done intentionally, this phenomenon happens time and
time again due to the backlogged and increasingly over-loaded immigration
courts.46
Many advocates have attempted to bring the age-out problem to the
forefront of Congress’s and the courts’ attention; however, they have failed
to receive a favorable response. For example, the Columbia Law School
Child Advocacy Clinic sent a letter to U.S. House Representative Jerrold
Nadler, urging him to advocate the ending of aging-out of SIJ status.47 The
Clinic pointed out to Nadler that it is often difficult to identify a young
person as undocumented, or to obtain documents necessary to apply for SIJ
status before aging-out.48 Additionally, the Immigration Prof Blog has
called for advocates who know of children in danger of aging-out to join
together to call this problem to the attention of the federal courts (this
summons ultimately led to the recent case Perez-Olano v. Gonzalez,
subsequently discussed).49
Opponents to the proposition of allowing an SIJ’s age to toll (i.e., stop
the child’s age at the time the application is filed) argue that the SIJ statute
does not provide for “infinite eligibility.”50 Rather, the SIJ statute allows for
SIJs to age-out.51 These opponents argue that this position is supported by
legislative history; in 1993, the age-out regulations were enacted, and when
Congress amended the statute in 1997 it did not disturb the age-out
regulations.52 Further, the regulations hold that this status is for juveniles
that are dependent on the juvenile court and the state; once such dependency
is terminated, these juveniles are no longer deserving of the status.53
However, due to the suffering and dire consequences these youths face if
they age-out of this status, the SIJ statute’s age-out requirement needs to be
reformed to allow an applicant’s age to toll instead of aging-out of the
program. The court has misinterpreted the statute and has ignored the
crucial purpose of the statute as clearly intended by Congress. Numerous
other INA provisions allow a child’s age to toll, thus preventing the child
from aging-out. However, SIJs were excluded from the Child Status
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Protection Act’s list of immigrant youths that are protected from aging-out,
even though SIJs are some of the most vulnerable and deserving immigrant
youths in the U.S. The ability of the USCIS to merely delay a juvenile
immigrant’s application until the juvenile has exceeded the age limit is
unacceptable. The SIJ statute needs to be interpreted differently because, as
it currently stands, the USCIS has discretion to hold onto the juvenile’s
petition until the juvenile ages-out of eligibility, causing extreme hardship
and jeopardizing the lives of these “specially protected” juveniles.
C. State-to-State Foster Care Age Requirements
Some SIJs age-out of foster care sooner than other SIJs because states
vary as to when children age-out of foster care or state dependency. In some
states, children age-out of foster care at eighteen and in others, at twentyone. For example, in Florida, a state with one of the nation’s largest
immigrant populations, state law defines a child as, “any unmarried person
under the age of 18 . . . alleged to be dependent, in need of services, or from
a family in need of services.”54 On the other hand, in the mid-1980s, New
York (also with a large immigrant population) raised its foster care age limit
to twenty-one in response to advocates’ calling for a higher age.55 New
York is just one in a handful of states that maintains responsibility for
children in foster care until the age of twenty-one.56
This variance in state law is critical to SIJs, as they are only eligible for
status under the current law as long as they are a dependent of the state.57
Hence, some youths will age-out sooner than others and therefore lose their
eligibility sooner. Thus, it is even more important for SIJs living in states
where the age limit is eighteen for SIJ-status eligibility, to begin their
application process as soon as possible, and therefore be protected from
aging-out. This inconsistency and geographically-determined unequal
treatment represents one more reason why the SIJ program should not
adhere to a strict requirement for state dependency, and instead should
allow for tolling once a qualified applicant submits his or her application.
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D. The Aftermath of Aging-out
Without legal status to be in the U.S., an SIJ cannot receive public
benefits, such as medical care, student loans, welfare, or other financial
benefits.58 Furthermore, these youths cannot legally apply for a job.59
Without protection from aging-out, potential SIJs will find themselves
members of two at-risk social groups: undocumented immigrants living in
the U.S. and unsupported ex-foster care recipients.
Youths aging-out of foster care often find themselves worse off than
before. Many advocates are pushing all states to raise their foster care age
limits to twenty-one because most eighteen-year-olds are still not ready or
able to be self-sufficient.60 Currently, an estimated twenty thousand children
age-out of foster care every year;61 within two to four years of aging-out, 25
percent are homeless, 40 percent are on public assistance, and 50 percent
are unemployed.62 Furthermore, about 25 percent of all aged-out males will
have been incarcerated and more than 50 percent of all females will have a
child.63 For example, in the state of Vermont, the Department of
Corrections’s records show that the fastest growing group of inmates is that
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. Additionally, children
previously in state custody have a disproportionately higher rate of
substance abuse, premature pregnancy, and mental health issues than the
rest of the general state population.64 One study, the Midwest Evaluation of
the Adult Functioning of Former Foster Youth, shows that 90 percent of
employed aged-out foster youths were making less than $10,000 per year.65
It is important to give potential SIJs a greater opportunity to gain
citizenship status. Overcoming barriers already faced by aged-out foster
youths is hard enough. However, the struggle to sustain and better one’s life
without citizenship, living in the underground world that many non-status
immigrants are forced to live in, is much more difficult. Furthermore, by
granting potential SIJs a fair chance at status rather than allowing them to
age-out as the result of administrative delays, Congress would create an
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opportunity for those children to better their lives by attending college and
gaining legal employment.

II. PEREZ-OLANO V. GONZALEZ
The U.S. District Court’s January 2008 decision in Perez-Olano v.
Gonzalez destroys the opportunity for some SIJs to seek refuge in the U.S.
In Perez-Olano, the court upheld the age-out provision of the SIJ statute.66
The plaintiffs were immigrant youths who had “been denied specific
consent to state court jurisdiction for [an] SIJ-predicate order, denied SIJ
status or SIJ-based adjustment of status pursuant to the ‘age-out
regulations,’ and/or were unable to apply for SIJ status or SIJ-based
adjustment of status pursuant to the removal regulations.”67
The plaintiffs brought a class action suit challenging government
policies, practices, and regulations with respect to the SIJ provisions of the
INA.68 The plaintiffs made three main allegations against the government.
First, the plaintiffs challenged the regulation enacted by the Attorney
General which enables an SIJ applicant to age-out of eligibility if the child
turns twenty-one-years-old before being granted SIJ status or SIJ-based
adjustment of status, or if the child is no longer a dependent on the state
court or no longer eligible for long-term foster care.69 Second, the plaintiffs
challenged the government’s policy requiring in-custody minors to obtain
ICE’s specific consent for an SIJ-predicate order, on the grounds that such
orders do not “determine the custody status or placement” of an in-custody
minor.70 Third, the plaintiffs challenged several regulations that apply to
SIJs in removal proceedings, arguing that the regulations unlawfully deny
SIJs adjudication of their adjustment of status applications.71 As to the three
challenges, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion in part and denied it in
part.72 Although the court ruled in the youths’ favor as to the specific
consent claim, the court denied the other two claims, upholding the current
age-out provision.73
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In order to determine whether the youths could bring a class action, the
plaintiffs had to meet the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.74 In legal parlance, class representation exists upon a
showing of numerosity, commonality, typicality, or adequacy,
respectively.75
Here, the plaintiffs proposed three subclasses for each of the three claims
brought. One such subclass was the “age-out subclass.”76 The plaintiffs
identified the “age-out subclass” as “youth[s] whose petitions for SIJ
classification [d]efendants deny or revoke pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§
204.11(c)(1) or (5), or 205.1(a)(3)(iv)(A), (C), or (D).”77
In trying to achieve class certification, the plaintiffs in Perez-Olano
simultaneously demonstrated why SIJs were in need of legal protection due
to their disadvantaged circumstances and the obstacles they faced due to
delay by DHS. First, as to the “numerosity” requirement for the age-out
subclass, the plaintiffs argued that the size of the subclass was uncertain
because the government does not maintain records of the number of persons
that submit SIJ applications and those applications are subsequently denied
or left undecided once the applicant ages-out.78 The defendants provided
support for this contention by declaring that the government has “not
tracked the number of persons denied SIJ classification or SIJ-based
adjustment of status due to the age-out regulations.”79 However, the
plaintiffs did make an approximation based upon the government’s estimate
of 2,258 SIJ applications filed between 2000 and 2006.80 The plaintiffs
proffered that approximately 375 SIJ applications are filed annually.81 The
plaintiffs also noted that in 1990, the majority of detained immigrant
juveniles were sixteen- or seventeen-years-old, and hence a majority of
these applicants were on the verge of aging-out from SIJ eligibility.82
The plaintiffs also offered declarations of immigration attorneys to
support their argument. The declarations represented that there were long
delays in the adjudication of SIJ applications and that there were many
instances of SIJ-eligible youths losing eligibility due to the age-out
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regulations.83 In addition, the plaintiffs provided testimony from attorneys
that had worked with immigrant children, many of whom had sought SIJ
classification and adjustment of status subject to the age-out regulations.
Based on the approximate statistics and information from immigration
attorneys, the plaintiffs maintained that hundreds of abused, abandoned, and
neglected youths are subject to the age-out regulations.84 On the weight of
this evidence, the court found that the numerosity element was satisfied.
To satisfy the “commonality” requirement of Rule 23, the plaintiffs
argued that common legal issues united the age-out subclass.85 The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had promulgated and adhered to ageout regulations which are inconsistent with the SIJ statute.86 Additionally,
the youths claimed that the defendants unreasonably delayed decisions on
SIJ and SIJ-based adjustment of status applications, causing class members
to age-out from eligibility.87 The court ultimately held that the youths’
claims established commonality as the group presented common legal
issues independent of class members’ factual differences.88
Under the “typicality” requirement, the plaintiffs claimed that the
defendants had adopted policies violating the INA by requiring specific
consent if the state court did not alter “custody status or placement.”89 The
plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants had a common policy of
delaying adjudication of SIJ applications until the youths age-out of
eligibility, creating a typicality of the class.90 The plaintiffs also alleged that
class members shared a specific injury—loss of SIJ eligibility.91
The court found that the plaintiff youths would adequately represent the
age-out subclass because they challenged the defendant’s authority to enact
and implement the age-out regulations, and the application of those
regulations.92 Additionally, the class members were similarly situated in
their claims, as all had lost their SIJ or SIJ-based adjustment of status
eligibility.93 Ultimately, the court held that the age-out regulations are
“generally applicable to the class,” and as their claims challenge common
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policies or practices and seek generally applicable injunctive relief, the
group satisfied the requirements of Rule 23.94
The plaintiffs also challenged several age-out regulations.95 First, the
group challenged 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(1), which precludes SIJ
classification once a youth is no longer “under twenty-one years of age.”96
This provision expressly provides, “[a]n alien is eligible for classification as
a special immigrant under section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Act if the alien [i]s
under twenty-one years of age.”97 Additionally, the plaintiffs challenged
legislative code 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(5), which requires that a youth
seeking SIJ status “[c]ontinues to be dependent upon the juvenile court and
eligible for long-term foster care, such declaration, dependency or eligibility
not having been vacated, terminated, or otherwise ended.”98 The plaintiffs
similarly challenged the age-out regulation for SIJ-based adjustment of
status, 8 C.F.R. §§ 205.1(a)(3)(iv)(A), (C), and (D), which revokes a
juvenile’s SIJ classification “[u]pon the beneficiary reaching the age of 21; .
. . the termination of the beneficiary’s dependency upon the juvenile court; .
. . [or] the termination of the [youth’s] eligibility for long-term foster
care.”99
To determine the plaintiffs’ claims as to the age-out regulations, the court
applied the deference standard derived from Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council.100 Under Chevron, the Supreme Court adopted a two-step
test for judicial review of administrative agency regulations that interpret
federal statutes. The first step is to consider whether Congress spoke
directly in the statute to the particular issue: “If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”101
However, where the statute is ambiguous or silent with respect to the issue,
a court proceeds to the second step. The court must then determine
“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”102 An agency’s interpretation of a regulation is permissible unless
that interpretation is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
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statute.”103 After the SIJ statute’s enactment in 1990, the Attorney General
adopted the age-out regulations under their authority to establish regulations
governing administration of the immigration system.104 Thus, the court’s
analysis of the application of the age-out regulations proceeded under this
general grant of regulatory authority. 105
A. Why Perez-Olano Was Wrongfully Decided
Under the Chevron test, “[c]ongressional intent may be determined by
‘traditional tools of statutory construction,’ and if a court using these tools
ascertains that Congress had a clear intent on the question at issue, that
intent must be given effect as law.”106 The traditional tools of statutory
construction are: (1) a review of the whole context of the statutory
language; (2) a common sense reading of the whole statute; (3) a
consideration of prior interpretation; and (4) a reading of applicable
legislative history.107 Hence, the court in Perez-Olano first looked to the
text of the SIJ statute. The statute provides eligibility to a child:
[W]ho has been declared dependent on a juvenile court . . . has been
deemed eligible by that court for long-term foster care due to abuse,
neglect, or abandonment . . . [and when it] has been determined . . .
that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to [their
home country].108
The plaintiffs stressed that the statute is written in the past-perfect tense,
a grammatical construction indicating that SIJ eligibility is not conditional
on either a child’s age, continued dependency on a juvenile court, or
continued eligibility for long-term foster care.109 Since the past-perfect tense
is used to show which of several events happens first, this grammatical
choice was of particular significance in interpreting the statute as written.
According to the plaintiffs, the juvenile’s eligibility is established once an
SIJ predicate order is granted, and the defendants must then decide whether
to grant SIJ status;110 thus, the plaintiffs argued that any regulations
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imposing additional eligibility requirements, such as continued eligibility
for long-term foster care, were unauthorized by the statute.111
The plaintiffs also argued that they were protected by the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which incorporates the guarantees of equal
protection.112 The plaintiffs maintained that because states differ with
respect to the age limit for state dependency (eighteen or twenty-one), it
would be a denial of equal protection for the court to condition SIJ
eligibility on continuing dependency.113 The plaintiffs argued that this
would allow some SIJs to receive eligibility if they resided in a state with a
broader dependency statute (permitting state dependency until age twentyone) while denying other SIJs eligibility if they live in a state with a
narrower statute (dependency until eighteen).114
On the other hand, the defendants responded that the SIJ statute does not
provide for “infinite eligibility.”115 Rather, the statute only speaks to the
criterion that establishes SIJ eligibility, not the duration of that eligibility.116
Further, the defendants emphasized that it was within the Attorney
General’s delegated authority to grant SIJ status based on an SIJ predicate
order.117 This is due to the fact that the Attorney General must expressly
consent to the dependency order which serves as a precondition for granting
SIJ status. Thus, according to the defendants, the SIJ statute permitted ageout regulations.118
In its ruling, the court began by looking to the express text of the
statute.119 The court agreed that the text of the statute provides for a child’s
SIJ eligibility once a state court makes the requisite findings in a SIJ
predicate order.120 However, the court reasoned that, although Congress
defined eligibility in terms of past state court findings, the statute did not
speak directly to the issue of aging-out.121 Thus, because Congress’s intent
with respect to the age-out issue was not addressed explicitly in the statute,
the court next looked to congressional intent, as reflected in the history and
purpose of the statutory scheme.122
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As evidenced by materials discussed in the next section, the purpose of
the SIJ statute is to protect abused, neglected, and abandoned immigrant
youths by providing a method for adjustment to lawful permanent resident
status. However, the court noted that Congress had not consistently
followed this goal in relation to the age-out regulations. The pertinent ageout regulations were enacted in 1993, a few years after the passage of the
SIJ statute.123 In 1997, when Congress amended the SIJ statute, it did not
disturb the age-out regulations.124 Additionally, the court observed that in
2002, when Congress passed the Child Status Protection Act, it chose to
exclude SIJ applicants from the list of juveniles that would be prevented
from aging-out.125 Thus, the court viewed this history as evidence that
Congress condoned the age-out regulations with respect to SIJ eligibility.126
Under Chevron, when Congress does not speak directly on an issue and
has delegated rulemaking authority to an agency, the court will consider
whether the agency interpretation is based upon a permissible construction
of the statute.127 If such interpretation is reasonable, the agency
interpretation will not be disturbed. Again, the purpose of the SIJ statute is
to protect immigrant children from abuse, neglect, and abandonment. Based
on that purpose, the court held that it is reasonable for the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) to limit eligibility for SIJ status or SIJ-based
adjustment of status to immigrant children, as opposed to older adolescents
or individuals who are no longer dependent on the state.128 Thus, the court
held that the BIA’s interpretation of the SIJ statute is consistent with
Congress’s goal. Hence, the age-out regulations were not held to be
arbitrary and capricious.129 The court ultimately reasoned that because the
defendants had authority to adopt the age-out regulations, and because the
regulation expressly declares that SIJs must be in continued legal custody of
the state or state agency, the regulations had a reasonable basis and were
therefore permissible under Chevron.130 However, the court did maintain
that the youths still had a right to raise claims that the defendants
unreasonably delayed adjudication of SIJ applications.131
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B. How Perez-Olano Should Have Been Decided
Using traditional tools of statutory construction, the court arrived at an
erroneous conclusion as to the validity of the age-out regulations of the SIJ
statute. The court misinterpreted the primary purpose of the statute, which is
to protect abused, abandoned, and neglected children. The court ignored the
fact that when these youths age-out, they still face the same struggles as
they did when they applied for SIJ status.
Looking to the congressional intent from the history and purpose of the
statutory scheme, it is more likely that Congress did not intend for these
youths to age-out of SIJ status.132 However, instead of focusing on the need
to protect these immigrant abuse victims, the court in Perez-Olano
interpreted the statute as only intending to help children. If the court had
recognized the primary purpose to be protection, the BIA’s interpretation
would have been seen as irrational and unreasonable. Thus, the court’s
interpretation does not adhere to the second prong of Chevron, as aging-out
puts these children in the same place they would have been without SIJ
status. How would a statute, intended to protect abandoned, abused, and
neglected immigrant youths, serve its purpose if the intended beneficiaries
are refused such status while their applications are pending? These youths
are automatically denied eligibility merely because of timing and
bureaucracy, although they continue to be in the same state of need as they
were the day before their eighteenth birthdays. Although perhaps not clearly
erroneous, such an evaluation takes the focus off the actual purpose of
protection. It is incorrect to examine the purpose of a statute by primarily
focusing on what age is to be protected without looking first to the more
obvious and objective purpose.
In practical terms, it is an unreasonable interpretation of the SIJ statute to
allow these youths to age-out of protection when their applications are
pending, as they still face the same strife as when they applied for SIJ
status. Without SIJ status, these immigrant youth fall into the shadows of
American society and are forced to live life in the underground world of
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undocumented immigrants. After aging-out, these children who sought
refuge in the U.S. are denied opportunities to acquire higher education, are
unable to get jobs due to lack of status, and will not qualify for government
support. In conclusion, the court in Perez-Olano, upon its own statutory
interpretation, erroneously emphasized “children” when determining the
purpose of the SIJ statute; instead, the court should have emphasized the
word “protect” when determining the purpose of the statute.

III. OTHER STATUTES AND TREATIES SUPPORTING A DIFFERENT
INTERPRETATION OF THE SIJ STATUTE
A. The Child Status Protection Act
Congress passed the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) in August 2002
after recognizing the age-out predicament faced by immigrant youths
caused by administrative processing time. The CSPA allows certain noncitizens to retain classification as a “child” under the INA, even if he or she
reaches the age of twenty-one. Thus, these children will never age-out of
status.133 The CSPA protects (a) direct beneficiaries of family-based
immigration petitions and (b) derivative beneficiaries in family-based,
employment-based, and diversity visa categories.134 Sections two and three
of the CSPA address the aging-out problems for the sons and daughters of
U.S. citizens and the children of lawful permanent residents. The CSPA
freezes the beneficiary’s age on the date that his or her visa petition is
filed.135 In other words, the beneficiary will be treated as a “child” as long
as he or she is under age twenty-one at the time the petition is filed with
USCIS. Further, derivative children—those applying for status through
another person from a family-based, employment-based, or diversity visa
petition—retain their derivative status even after turning twenty-one.136
Similarly, children who were under the age of twenty-one at the time their
parents filed an application for asylum, for refugee status, or for relief under
the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) are accorded status even if they
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are over twenty-one at the time their applications are approved.137 However,
not only did Congress not include a provision that eliminates SIJs from
aging-out, but Congress did not include SIJs in the list of children protected
by the CSPA.
Congress should have either included a provision in the SIJ statute or
provided protection for SIJs in the CSPA. Through the CSPA, Congress has
recognized that certain children should not age-out of the protections of
various statutes; Congress should also recognize that SIJs should be
protected from aging-out. Through the passage of the CSPA, Congress
acknowledged the injustice of allowing children to age-out while their
applications are being processed. SIJs are just as deserving, if not more
deserving, than the children protected in the CSPA. The children protected
by the CSPA are those who have the family support in the U.S. By contrast,
SIJs are children who lack parental guidance and support and who have
come to the U.S. alone in search of safety or a better life.
The fact that SIJs do not have family in the U.S. should help, rather than
hinder them, in seeking legal status. Without parental support, these
children can only rely on themselves, their friends, and the U.S. government
for help. Moreover, the fact that SIJs do not have parents or family in the
U.S. should provide an even stronger reason for Congress to assist these
children. SIJs deserve more protection through state foster care; however,
this system is ill-equipped and unwilling to petition for each SIJ.
Furthermore, as subsequently discussed, SIJs face similar struggles as
children seeking asylum and refuge. Since children seeking asylum and
refugee status are protected by the CSPA, SIJs should also be protected by
the CSPA. SIJs face the same (if not more) devastating problems as asylumseekers. As Congress has routinely recognized through the CSPA and its
asylum and refugee programs, juvenile immigrant applicants deserve to be
protected from aging-out. For all of the aforementioned reasons, Congress
should recognize that SIJs should also be protected from aging-out.
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Moreover, the CSPA protects children filing for VAWA relief as
immediate relatives of other VAWA applicants.138 Passed in 2000, VAWA
created a “U visa” for people that have suffered substantial physical or
mental abuse as a result of several enumerated acts of violence, including
torture, trafficking, domestic violence, sexual assault, and felonious
assault.139 SIJs should qualify as beneficiaries of this visa, since they are the
direct, first-hand victims of domestic violence. SIJs have been shunned,
abused both physically and mentally, and neglected by their own parents—
the people that were supposed to protect and provide for them. As the
CSPA protects children who are victims (or even derivative victims) of
domestic violence and abuse under VAWA, so too, should SIJs be protected
by the CSPA. Therefore, as Congress has recognized through the CSPA that
certain children should not age-out of protection through various statutes,
Congress should also recognize that SIJs should be protected from agingout.
B. Asylum-seekers
The distinction between unaccompanied child asylum-seekers and SIJs is
minimal, and both should be afforded similar protections, including the
inability to age-out once a proper application is submitted. The United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Guidelines on the
Protection and Care of Refugee Children and the Guidelines on Policies and
Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Minors has defined an
unaccompanied minor as an individual “who is separated from both parents
and is not being cared for by an adult who by law or custom has
responsibility to do so.”140 Furthermore, U.S. guidelines define an
unaccompanied minor as a child “under the age of 18 who seek[s]
admission to the U.S. and who [is] not accompanied by a parent or
guardian.”141 It has been estimated that in the U.S., approximately 70
percent of children apprehended by ICE fall under this definition of an
unaccompanied minor.142 It is estimated that about 4,700 unaccompanied
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minors are detained annually by ICE.143 Most significantly, when an
unaccompanied minor reaches the age of adulthood (eighteen) before a
decision is reached on his application for asylum or while waiting for a
decision from an appeal of a denial of status, the child continues to be
treated as a minor.144 This is because the focus is placed on the child’s
circumstances and age at the time of entry, rather than the child’s
circumstances and age while awaiting the processing of his or her
application.145 Therefore, an unaccompanied child seeking asylum will
never age-out of eligibility.
How can the U.S. justify making unaccompanied child asylum-seekers
unable to age-out while refusing this privilege to SIJs? This question is
especially puzzling because SIJs can also fulfill all the requisite
requirements for asylum. In order to be granted asylum, an applicant must
establish that he or she is a person “who is unable or unwilling to return to,
and unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of” his
or her nationality “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.”146 This means that the child
must show he or she was persecuted in the past or has a well-founded fear
of being persecuted in the future, and that the persecution is based on one of
the five enumerated grounds.147
C. The Family as a Particular Social Group
The element of “particular social group,” although difficult to satisfy, has
been found fulfilled in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in AguirreCervantes v. INS.148 In that case, the court held for the first time that
“victims of domestic violence may seek asylum based on their abuse at
home because the family forms a protected ‘social group’ under the U.S.
asylum law.”149 The court held that an immediate family whose members all
live together and are subject to severe abuse by a family member could be
recognized as a “protected particular social group.”150 To this end, the court
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also maintained that the asylum-seeker must show that the persecuting
family member is a person that the government is unable or unwilling to
control, and that the government often overlooks domestic violence
situations.151 Hence, under very specific circumstances, this element might
be met in a child asylum case.
D. Abandonment, Abuse, or Neglect as Persecution
Abandonment, abuse, or neglect of a child rises to the level of
persecution. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
(subsequently discussed) holds that, specific to children, persecution can
arise more readily because of the child’s heightened dependence and need
for assistance and protection.152 Additionally, article seven of the
Convention establishes parental care as a basic human right of a child.153
Thus, children who are abandoned, abused, or neglected by their parents or
families may be considered persecuted because they are either unwanted or
the family is unable to provide for them, and the state fails to provide
adequate surrogate protection.154 Further, the denial of a child’s basic social
and economic rights—the opportunity to attend school, access to health
care, food, and housing—has been recognized by the international
community through the CRC as a violation which may rise to the level of
persecution.155
E. The Parent as the Agent of Harm
To fulfill the elements of asylum, the child must demonstrate that the
experienced or feared persecution is attributable to the government or an
agent that the government is incapable or unwilling to control.156 This last
element is one of the biggest challenges SIJs face, and is one reason why
SIJs may fail to qualify for asylum. SIJs do not face persecution by the
government, but at the hands of their own parents. Although evading the
government is not easy, it can be even harder to escape from one’s own
parents, especially within one’s own country. It has been noted that
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attempting to flee from a situation of domestic violence to a nearby
relative’s or friend’s home is likely to be futile for a child, as the child is
easily found by immediate family in those places.157 Although parents have
the right to punish and discipline their children, international human rights
norms prevent punishment that is cruel, inhuman, or degrading, rising to the
level of persecution.158 Similarly, a parent may acquiesce to the child being
abused by allowing physical or sexual abuse of the child by the parent’s
partner.159
The most likely scenario for qualifying a parent as an agent of harm is
when the parent is routinely successful in evading governmental sanctions,
or if state services turn a blind eye towards the abuse of an asylum-seeking
child. The Ninth Circuit, in Aguirre-Cervantes, found that the government
of Mexico was not willing to protect a child from domestic abuse due to its
lack of recognition of domestic violence.160 One author notes, in speaking
about principles deriving from the CRC, a child who fears persecution by
abusive parents, as opposed to the government, may qualify for asylum.161
Hence, a parent may also be an agent of harm. Aguirre-Cervantes is
recognized as paving the way for a small group of eligible immigrant
children who fall within the same fact pattern of domestic violence to
qualify for asylum.162
While unaccompanied child asylum-seekers are strikingly similar to SIJs,
the latter are prevented from aging-out of status while the former are not.
First, SIJs may often fit within the particular “social group” of belonging to
an abuse-stricken family. Like the victim in Aguirre-Cervantes, SIJs have
experienced some form of abuse, abandonment, or neglect at the hands of
an abusive parent, thus fulfilling the persecution requirement. Moreover, it
is highly unlikely that a child would run the risk of fleeing the familiarity
and comfort of his or her own country in place of a reasonable alternative or
if the child knew he or she could turn to and rely on the local government
for help. Thus, it seems that SIJs meet the baseline requirements of an
unaccompanied child asylum-seeker; nonetheless, child asylum-seekers are
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granted special help in the form of protection from aging-out. Given their
similarities, it is absurd for Congress to draw distinctions between asylumseekers and SIJs by protecting asylum-seekers from aging-out, while
allowing SIJs to age-out.
F. The Convention on the Rights of the Child
International jurisprudence on the rights of children greatly improved in
the last twenty years. Created in 1989, the United Nations’s CRC is the first
international convention to incorporate a full range of human rights for
children—civil, cultural, economic, political, and social.163 The CRC was
created to address the reality that children need a particular convention,
because people under eighteen years of age often need special care and
protection separate from that provided for adults.164 The drafters also
advocated for the CRC to establish world recognition that children have
human rights.165 Significantly, more countries have ratified the CRC than
any other human rights treaty.166 Nevertheless, the U.S.—a world leader and
advocate for human rights, and one of the five countries with a seat on the
General Assembly of the United Nations—is one of only two countries to
have signed but not ratified the treaty.167 The other, Somalia, lacks an
internationally recognized government capable of executing ratification.168
One of the central principles of the CRC is that there should be no delay
in making decisions about children. Section 1(2) of the CRC states that “in
any proceedings in which any question with respect to the upbringing of a
child arises, the court shall have regard to the general principle that any
delay in determining the question is likely to prejudice the welfare of the
child.”169 This principle reflects the maxim that delay defeats justice, and
that undue delay has heightened consequences for children and their
development.170 Thus, the CRC maintains that children should be held in
higher regard when it comes to determining their immigration status, and,
moreover, that their petitions for aid should be granted priority and
expedited review.
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It is unacceptable for the U.S. not to be a signatory to the CRC. Because
the U.S. has not ratified the treaty, it does not have to fully abide by its
terms. Thus, the U.S. must take only minimal action in upholding the rights
of children as defined by its own statutes and regulations. President Barack
Obama has described the failure to ratify the CRC as “embarrassing” and
has promised to review the U.S. decision.171 Those opposed to the
ratification of the CRC argue that being a party to the CRC will open the
door to outside interference from government and United Nations officials
regarding the parents’ rights to raise a child as they see fit.172 Fortunately, it
appears as though the movement for the U.S. to ratify the CRC is becoming
stronger.173
Hopefully, President Obama will refocus the U.S. position on the CRC
and formally commit to upholding the Convention. Since treaties are
supreme law, if the U.S. were to adopt the CRC there would be a much
stronger argument for extending aging-out protections to SIJs.174 Given
Section 1(2) of the CRC, eliminating the age-out provision would bring the
SIJ statute into accordance with the treaty. Time regulations must be
imposed on USCIS agents for reviewing SIJ applications, giving applicants
closest to aging-out an expedited status, and a provision must be added to
the SIJ statute to protect children from aging-out while their applications are
pending. Even if the U.S. only ratified the treaty (as opposed to codifying
it), it would still have to address cases involving children in a timely
manner and prevent SIJs from aging-out.

IV. THE SIJ’S RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION
Currently, despite a complex and complicated immigration system, all
U.S. immigrants, including child immigrants, have no legal right to
representation. Legal representation for children is highly important—
children lack the experience and sophistication to understand the
complexity of the law and the personal implications of applying for SIJ
status or other forms of relief. The United Kingdom and Canada have state-
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funded representation to assist children with their asylum claims.175 SIJs
actually fit within Canada’s definition of an unaccompanied child, as “those
who are alone in Canada without their parents or anyone who purports to be
a family member.”176 In Canada, unaccompanied children are warranted
special procedural treatment throughout their refugee status
determinations.177 These special accommodations include: ensuring the
swift identification of unaccompanied children; appointing an officer to
maintain responsibility for the child’s case throughout the entirety of the
determination procedure; prioritizing these claims in order to process them
as expeditiously as possible; and facilitating pre-hearing conferences to
assess evidence the child is able to provide, including the best way to elicit
this information.178 Further, the best interests of the child must be taken into
account and reflected in the decision regarding the child’s status.179
The U.S. has looked to Canada to help create procedures and standards
for the adjudication of child asylum claims.180 The U.S. should follow
Canada’s example by including SIJs in its definition of an unaccompanied
child asylum-seeker and afford SIJs the same representation and procedural
advantages as potential asylees, particularly by requiring that SIJ claims be
processed expeditiously. From a simple appreciation of due process, SIJs
should be granted the right to representation because they are children; even
older adolescents may not have the requisite knowledge and capability to
complete an application for SIJ status. Children and adolescents need extra
guidance and help in dealing with legal matters, especially for such an
important matter as that of legal citizenship status. As child asylum-seekers
are very similar to SIJs, SIJs should be afforded the same type of protection
in the U.S. Like Canada, the U.S. should afford potential SIJs the right to
counsel as they go through the lengthy and difficult application process,
especially given the timeliness and urgency such applications currently
require due to the threat of aging-out.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
To remedy the problem of deserving SIJs aging-out, first and foremost,
the SIJ provision of the INA needs to be amended to prevent this
occurrence. If the INA explicitly stated that SIJs could not age-out of status
once a valid and qualified application were submitted, then the BIA would
not be allowed to apply its own interpretation of the SIJ statute. For
example, a provision could be added stating that as long as the application
is filed before the child has reached the age of majority or aged-out of the
foster care system, the child will not age-out of SIJ status. This way, the
child’s age would toll from the time the application is submitted. Thus, the
holding of Perez-Olano would be reversed, and the application procedure
would better reflect the main purpose of the SIJ program—to protect abused
and vulnerable immigrant youths. Secondly, when a child comes into foster
care, like in Canada, an officer or agent should be appointed to the child.
This officer would be responsible for checking the child’s legal status and
flagging a child for SIJ eligibility if the child’s situation warranted such
status.
With or without a legislative revision of the INA statute, the U.S.
Supreme Court should take the first available opportunity to revisit the issue
of SIJs aging-out and reverse its ruling in Perez-Olano. The Court should
recognize that the SIJ program’s emphasis is on protecting abused and
vulnerable immigrant youths regardless of their age of majority, and thus
overrule the BIA’s interpretation of the statute as unreasonable. It is not a
reasonable interpretation of the statute to allow SIJs to age-out when their
applications are still pending and they applied as minor children. The very
thing that makes SIJs’ status “special” is their vulnerability, due to the
threat of living in a society where they have no legal status and are forced to
live without any of that society’s benefits and without a support network of
family and friends. Allowing SIJs to age-out leads to the opposite outcome:
harming SIJs and making their future harder than warranted.
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Furthermore, special regulations should be set in place to ensure that
USCIS and other immigration officers expedite and pay particular attention
to SIJ applications, especially when those children are on the verge of
aging-out. Immigration officers should be required to expedite those
immigration applications which need immediate attention due to application
deadlines. The U.S. should place these mandatory expedition requirements
upon immigration officials, following the principle of “no delay” set forth
by the CRC. Requiring immigration officials to prioritize SIJ applications
would comport with one of the main principles of the CRC. Currently,
ICE’s primary responsibility is to enforce immigration regulations within
the U.S.181 Given this purpose, many immigration agents focus on
deportation.182 Discretion as to the timing of an SIJ’s application should not
be left in the hands of an agency whose inclination is to deport immigrants.
Immigration authorities are not primarily focused on the well-being of SIJs
and the implications of illegal status on a young immigrant’s life. Therefore,
immigration processors should be required to expedite an SIJ’s application.
Without such a mandate, there is little hope that an agent will exercise the
expediency to push such an application through as soon as they possibly
can. It is absolutely shameful for the U.S. to be one of the two countries out
of 140 to have signed the CRC, but have not ratified it.183 The U.S. needs to
promptly reexamine its position on the CRC. Once it does, Congress should
reformulate its position on SIJs’ ability to age-out and should conform to
the principle of “no delay” in processing a child’s application.
Furthermore, the U.S. should treat SIJs like unaccompanied asylumseekers. After the decision in Aguirre-Cervantes, SIJs and asylum-seekers
are similar in position. First, SIJs fall within the definition of
unaccompanied minors as held by both the U.S. and the UNHCR.184
Further, as exemplified by Aguirre-Cervantes, there is a movement towards
perceiving children who are victims of domestic violence as eligible for
asylum.185 These child asylum-seekers can show that they face persecution
by their parents and fall within a particular social group of being a member
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of a family suffering from abuse by a family member. As child asylumseekers are not allowed to age-out, their similar counterparts, SIJs, should
be allotted the same protection.
Finally, Congress should eliminate an SIJ’s ability to age-out due to the
obstacles that these children face after aging-out of foster care and,
therefore, SIJ eligibility. The fact that most children who age-out of foster
care, even with status, find themselves struggling without jobs, living with
an increased rate of incarceration, or even living homeless shows that SIJs
should at least be afforded an equal playing field by giving them a chance to
receive legal citizenship status. Without such status, SIJs have even less
chance of bettering their lives, as they lack the ability to receive public
benefits and are forced to live in the underground world of undocumented
immigrants. These youths deserve an opportunity to better their lives after
being abandoned, abused, and neglected by their own parents. These youths
need to be given a fair chance at earning status by not allowing them to ageout after going through all the procedural steps to get such status. Going one
step further, Congress could follow Canada’s example by providing these
children with special procedural advantages and a right to legal
representation.

VI. CONCLUSION
Congress passed the Special Immigrant Juvenile statute to provide a
special group of immigrant children a means to create better lives for
themselves and to protect these children from prior lives shadowed by
abuse, abandonment, and neglect. However, SIJs are not protected when
they are allowed to age-out of eligibility. Congress and the international
community have recognized on numerous fronts that children deserve
special protection, expedited procedures, and extra attention. Congress must
give these children the special protection and opportunity that they deserve
to succeed in life, especially after having suffered a life of abuse. The
ability of SIJs to age-out must end.
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